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CRIMINAL LAW-REVIEW: EXERCISING JURISDICTION TO
PROSECUTE A PRIEST FOR THEFT IS CONSTITUTIONAL
State v. Burckhard,
1998 N.D. 121, 579 N.W.2d 194
I. FACTS
From July 1989 to October 1996, Father Leonard Burckhard was
the parish priest for St. Catherine's Church in Valley City, North Dakota,
which is within the Fargo Diocese of the Roman Catholic Church.1 In
December 1995, concerns regarding Burckhard's use of parish funds
were brought to the attention of the Fargo Diocese by members of the
church. 2 The problem came to light after a parishioner, asked by Burck-
hard to examine the books for the rectory account, became suspicious of
discrepancies in the account figures. 3
On January 4, 1996, Monsignor Wendelyn Vetter, vicar general of
the Fargo Catholic Diocese,4 met with Scott Hoselton, a certified public
accountant and fiscal manager of the diocese, and Burckhard to discuss
the need for an audit. 5 At the meeting, Vetter instructed Burckhard to
cease all personal transactions. 6 Between January and July of 1996, the
diocese conducted its audit and obtained copies of bank statements,
checks, credit card statements, and invoices from the various institutions
involved.7
The audit revealed that between 1991 and 1996, approximately
$120,000-130,000 in funds were deposited into the rectory account. 8
The audit further revealed that between 1991 and 1994 and in 1996,
$82,907 of the funds in the account were used directly for personal
expenditures by Burckhard and that an additional $39,107 was used for
1. State v. Burckhard, 1998 N.D. 121, 2, 579 N.W.2d 194, 195. James Sullivan was at all rele-
vant times and continues to be the Bishop of the Fargo Diocese. Brief for Appellee at 4, State v.
Burckhard, 1998 N.D. 121, 579 N.W.2d 194 (No. 970275). St. Catherine's Church is a North Dakota
corporation. Burckhard, 2, 579 N.W.2d at 195.
2. REPORT OF INVESTIGATION FROM THE OFFICE OF THE N.D. ATTORNEY GENERAL, B UREAU OF CIMI-
NAL INVESTIGATION (No. 960390), at 1 (Nov. 7, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter ATTORNEY
GENERAL REPORT].
3. Deneen Gilmour, Bishop Relieves Valley City Priest of His Duties, FARGOF., Oct. 15, 1997, at
Al.
4. Id.
5. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-2.
6. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-2. In spite of this instruction, however, Burck-
hard continued converting funds from the rectory account for his personal use until July 15, 1996.
ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
7. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
8. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. These deposits included transfers from other
church accounts, Burckhard's personal funds, his food allowances, and other transfers. ATTORNEY
GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
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credit card payments without further detail regarding whether the pay-
ments were for personal expenses. 9 Burckhard estimated that thirty-
three percent of the credit card payments, or $13,057, was used for
personal expenses.10 Therefore, Burckhard admitted that he spent an
overall total of $95,964 from the account for his personal use. I I In ad-
dition to the parish funds, Burckhard deposited approximately $26,525
of his own money into the account during the same time period.12 Thus,
Burckhard converted $69,439 of parish funds for personal use.13
In September 1996, Burckhard began making restitution transfers
from various accounts and securities to St. Catherine's and the diocese. 14
These restitution payments totaled $62,872, leaving an unpaid balance of
$6,567.15
9. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
10. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
11. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
12. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
13. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
14. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. Some of the repayment was possible because
Burckhard bought stocks with the converted funds. Gilmour, supra note 3, at Al. After discovery of
his wrongdoing, the Fargo Diocese ordered Burckhard to turn the stocks over to the church. Gilmour,
supra note 3, at Al.
15. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. The figures provided in the text are provided
in simplified form below:
BURCKHARD'S PERSONAL EXPENDITURES:
Direct personal expenditures $82,907
Credit card payments admittedly






BALANCE UNPAID BY BURCKHARD:
Total personal expenditures $95,964
Total funds contributed - 89.379
TOTAL 6,567
ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3. The State, however, disputed the accuracy of many
of the figures used in the accounting. Appendix to Brief for Appellant at app. 17-18, State v. Burck-
hard, 1998 N.D. 121, 579 N.W.2d 194 (No. 970275). For example, the State challenged the amount of
the restitution payments, arguing that they were made from accounts containing money which had
been stolen from the church and suggesting that this should not be considered appropriate restitution.
Id. at app. 18. Further, the State argued the figures used were inaccurate and underestimated, and that
much less of the money was used on legitimate expenses than was reported. Id. For example, the
State questioned the legitimacy of $17,000 spent on credit card payments for expenses which had a
minimal relationship to church business. Id. Presumably because of its dissatisfaction with both the
accounting of expenses and with the amount of alleged restitution, the State prosecuted Burckhard for
theft of property without considering the disputed amount of restitution. See Brief for Appellant at 2-4,
State v. Burckhard, 1998 N.D. 121, 579 N.W.2d 194 (No. 970275) (stating that the criminal complaint
alleged that Burckhard committed theft of over $100,000 but not addressing the issue of alleged
restitution).
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Additionally, St. Catherine's hired a private accounting firm to con-
duct an independent audit of the rectory account. 16 Neither St. Cath-
erine's nor the Fargo Diocese filed a civil suit against Burckhard.17
Burckhard was removed from the parish on October 20, 1996.18
In April 1997, the State of North Dakota filed a criminal infor-
mation against Burckhard, alleging theft of property.19 The complaint
stated that Burckhard knowingly exercised unauthorized control over
more than $100,000 in church money, which he spent on various
personal expenses with the intent to deprive the church.20
Burckhard filed a motion for dismissal in July 1997,21 pursuant to
Rule 12 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. 22 Burckhard
had three contentions supporting dismissal: 23 1) lack of subject matter
jurisdiction; 2) that he had "legal" authority over funds under the law
of the Roman Catholic Church; and 3) that prosecution was inappropri-
ate, under the precedent of State v. Brakke, 24 because a legitimate dis-
pute existed regarding his use of the account. 25 The district court
16. Appendix to Brief for Appellant at app. 33, State v. Burckhard, 1998 N.D. 121, 579 N.W.2d
194 (No. 970275).
17. Gilmour, supra note 3, at Al. Incidentally, Burckhard was revered by many church officials,
members and staff, particularly for his financial acumen. Gilmour, supra note 3, at Al. As an
example of his leadership and fund raising ability, Burckhard raised money for a $500,000 renovation
of St. Catherine's Church. Gilmour, supra note 3, at Al. This renovation was funded entirely and
Burckhard additionally built a $237,000 savings account for the church. Gilmour, supra note 3, at Al.
Additionally, Monsignor Vetter of the Fargo Diocese stated that Burckhard was an excellent
administrator. ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. Vetter also noted that Burckhard had
been diagnosed with manic depression and that perhaps his illness was a reason behind his actions.
Gilmour, supra note 3, at Al. In another source, however, Vetter is cited as stating that Burckhard
was in counseling for obsessive-compulsive disorder. Gilmour, supra note 3, at Al. Vetter further
said in this source that "Burckhard's disorder involves 'buying things."' Gilmour, supra note 3, at Al.
18. Supplemental Appendix to Brief for Appellee at app. 96, State v. Burckhard, 1998 N.D. 121,
579 N.W.2d 194 (No. 970275) (citing letter from James S. Sullivan, Bishop of Fargo Diocese of the
Catholic Church to Robert Hoy, Attorney for Burckhard (July 21, 1997)).
19. Appendix to Brief for Appellant at app. 3, Burckhard (No. 970275); see also N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-23-02(1) (1997) (providing that "[a] person is guilty of theft if he: (1) [klnowingly takes
or exercises unauthorized control over, or makes an unauthorized transfer of an interest in, the
property of another with intent to deprive the owner thereof'); N.D. CEr. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2)
(1997) (providing, in relevant part, that "theft under this chapter is a class B felony if the property or
services stolen exceed ten thousand dollars in value").
20. State v. Burckhard, 1998 N.D. 121, 2, 579 N.W.2d 194, 195. Examples of the alleged
personal expenditures are, among others, payments on personal credit cards, payments to relatives and
payments for fishing trips. Id.
21. Brief for Appellee at 1, State v. Burckhard, 1998 N.D. 121, 579 N.W.2d 194 (No. 970275).
22. Burckhard, 3, 579 N.W.2d at 195. Rule 12(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides in relevant part that "[any defense, objection, or request which is capable of
determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion." N.D. R.
CRIM. P. 12(b) (1998).
23. Burckhard, 3, 579 N.w.2d at 195.
24. 474 N.w.2d 878, 882 (N.D. 1991).
25. State v. Brakke, 474 N.W.2d 878, 882 (N.D. 1991). Brakke involved criminal prosecutions
for theft of property and attempted theft of property arising out of the defendant's harvesting of crops
from land which he owned before harvest but lost through a partition action prior to harvest. Id. at 879.
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granted the motion for dismissal on September 2, 199726 for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because a determination of the scope of
Burckhard's authority over the church funds required an interpretation
of religious law or doctrine, a matter left to the church to decide. 27
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remand-
ed the district court's decision on the jurisdictional issue. 28 The court
held the district court's exercise over prosecution of theft charges
against Burckhard does not require excessive government entanglement
in religious affairs in violation of either the state or federal constitu-
tion. 29 The court further held the alternative grounds for dismissal
presented by Burckhard were without merit.30
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
State v. Burckhard31 involves a conflict between church and state.
The resolution of such conflicts requires an interpretation of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . ."32
This clause, and all of the principles of the First Amendment, are made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 33
Corresponding to the Establishment Clause, a provision of the North
Dakota Constitution specifies that "[tihe free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that a legitimate dispute existed over the right to the crops and
held that criminal prosecution was therefore inappropriate. Id. at 882. Burckhard argued that the
questions involving his authority over the assets of St. Catherine's parish were analogous to the issue of
the disputed ownership of the crops in Brakke, so that Brakke required dismissal. Brief for Appellee
at 33-34, Burckhard (No. 970275).
26. Brief for Appellee at 4, Burckhard (No. 970275).
27. Burckhard, 4, 579 N.W.2d at 195. The district court stated that determination of the scope
of authority of a priest would require interpretation of ecclesiastical government, which should be left
to the church to resolve. Id.
28. Id. l.
29. Id.
30. Id. 39, 579 N.W.2d at 203.
31. 1998 N.D. 121, 579 N.W.2d 194.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309 (1952); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 261
(1934). The 14th Amendment, in relevant part, states that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Therefore, the
Establishment Clause, as a guarantor of religious "liberty," applies to state action through the 14th
Amendment. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
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shall be forever guaranteed in this state." 34 The North Dakota Supreme
Court has determined that the Establishment Clause and the state consti-
tutional provisions are "[t]o the same effect."35
1. The Development of Civil Court Deference to Decisions of
the Church on Ecclesiastical Issues
The seminal case addressing the limitation of governmental
entanglement in ecclesiastical issues is Watson v. Jones.36 Decided in the
aftermath of the Civil War, Watson involved a property dispute resulting
from bitter disagreement over the issue of slavery. 37 From the outbreak
of the war, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church supported
the position of the federal government against the institution of
slavery. 38 As a result, the General Assembly declared that whenever any
person from a southern state applied to be a minister or member of the
church, inquiry would be made regarding that person's loyalty to the
government and sentiments on the subject of slavery. 39 The Presbytery
of Louisville, Kentucky, which had immediate jurisdiction over a local
Presbyterian congregation, the Walnut Street Church, denounced this
action of the General Assembly.4 0 In response, the General Assembly
declared that every Presbytery refusing to obey its order would be
dissolved.41 The congregation of the Walnut Street Church was badly
divided over the General Assembly's pronouncement, and a dispute over
the ownership of church property ensued.4 2
In resolving the dispute in Watson, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that the religious organization involved in the dispute was
34. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3.
35. Bendewald v. Ley, 168 N.W. 693, 696 (N.D. 1917). The court further stated that civil autho-
rities are prohibited under both the state and federal constitutions from controlling or interfering in
purely ecclesiastical matters. Id.
36. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). Watson was a diversity case, decided before the First Amend-
ment had been rendered applicable to the states through the 14th Amendment, based on common law
principles regarding the appropriate role of civil courts in resolving religious questions affecting civil
rights. Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976). Additionally, Watson
predated Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), by many years, and although federal juris-
diction in Watson depended solely on diversity, the holding was based on general federal law rather
than the state law of Kentucky, as it would have been under Erie. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94, 115-16 (1952).
37. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 684 (1871).
38. Id. at 690-91.
39. Id. at 691.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 691-92.
42. Id. at 692-93. From the outset, the Court rejected the doctrine of English courts, which
provides that courts have a duty to inquire and determine the true standard of faith in the church
organization and which of the contending parties before the court holds to this standard. Id. at 727.
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hierarchical in nature. 43 Under such an organizational scheme, property
rights are determined neither by the instrument which conveys the
property nor by any particular form or worship of religious dogma, but
rather by determining the ascertainable congregation, which is entitled to
the use of the property.44 However, the Court recognized that the local
congregation is but a member of a much larger religious organization,
under its government and control, and bound by its orders. 45 The Court
thus held that final decisions of the highest ranks of governing religious
bodies are binding on civil courts when addressing questions of ecclesias-
tical rule, custom, or law, or questions involving discipline or faith.46
Moreover, the court emphasized that it is the essence of religious organi-
zations, and of their right to govern themselves, that their decisions be
binding when dealing with ecclesiastic issues, and such decisions may be
appealed only through channels the church itself provides.4 7
Later cases, however, identified appropriate circumstances for the
exercise of marginal civil court review of ecclesiastical determinations.4 8
Such circumstances include the use of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness
43. Id. at 726-27. The Court identified three groups into which the questions which had come be-
fore the civil courts regarding property rights held by religious bodies could be divided: 1) cases in
which the property was given expressly to be used in furtherance of some specific religious doctrine;
2) cases in which property is held by a congregation which is independent of other religious organi-
zations and owes no obligation to any higher authority; and 3) cases in which the property is held by a
congregation which is subordinate to some general church organization in which there are superior
authorities with a general and ultimate power over the whole membership of the general organization.
Id. at 722-23. The religious organization involved in Watson falls under the third classification. Id. at
726. Conforming with the language used in Watson, the Court later expressly defined "hierarchical
churches" as "those organized as a body with other churches having similar faith and doctrine with a
common ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head." Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94,
110(1952).
44. Watson, 80 U.S. at 726-27.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 727.
47. Id. at 729. Language from Watson is often quoted in cases involving governmental review or
interpretation of church doctrine, polity, or law, because of its "constitutional ring." Presbyterian
Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446 (1969).
The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment
of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expres-
sion and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision
of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical govern-
ment of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general
association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an
implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain
consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one ag-
grieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them
reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish
tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions
should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals
as the organism itself provides for.
Watson, 80 U.S. at 728-729.
48. See Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 447 (citing Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131
(1872)); Brundage v. Deardorf, 55 F. 839 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893)).
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by church officials. 49 However, unless such circumstances exist, ecclesi-
astical issues decided by the church must be accepted as conclusive by
secular courts, even though those decisions may affect civil rights. 50
In 1952, the Supreme Court in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral51
converted the principle of civil court deference to churches on ecclesias-
tic issues, first presented in Watson, into a constitutional rule based on
the Fourteenth Amendment. Kedroff involved a New York statute recog-
nizing the administrative autonomy of the Russian Orthodox Churches
of North America from the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church. 52
The Court invalidated this statute, holding that state legislation which in-
volves the regulation of church administration or operation prohibits the
free exercise of religion and thus violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 53
The Court extended the holding of Kedroff, which invalidated intru-
sive legislative action based on the Fourteenth Amendment, to judicial
action in Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.54 In Kreshik, the Court re-
versed a judgment of the New York courts which had transferred control
of the particular church involved from the governing authority of the
Russian Orthodox Church to the Russian Church of America. 55
49. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929). Gonzalez involved a dispute
over entitlement to income under a will that turned upon an ecclesiastical determination of whether an
individual would be appointed to a chaplaincy in the Roman Catholic Church. Id. at 4. The Court
stated that determination of the essential qualifications of a chaplain, and whether a candidate
possesses them, is a function for church authorities because such determinations involve ecclesiastical
controversies. Id. at 16.
50. Id.
51. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
52. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 97-99 (1952). The Russian Orthodox Church
experienced a period of significant turmoil and change in Russia beginning in 1917. Id. at 101-02.
The patriarch of the church was imprisoned for his counter-revolutionary involvement in the
Bolshevik Revolution, and church power changed hands several times. Id. at 102. Upheaval in the
Russian Church continued for several years, and many Russians found political and religious asylum in
America. Id. at 102-03. The Russian turmoil made administration of the American diocese very diffi-
cult for the Russian Church. Id. at 103. Therefore, the Russian Church in 1920 granted the American
diocese temporary autonomy until the Russian authority was stabilized. Id. During this time and in the
years that followed, members of the American diocese became increasingly distant from the Russian
Church, and a separatist movement began in the American diocese. Id. The orders for temporary
autonomy continued until 1945, when the Russian Church in Moscow demanded a reunion with the
American Orthodox Church. Id. at 105. The American congregations refused this arrangement. Id.
The New York Legislature in 1945 added an article to the Religious Corporations Law which provided
both for the incorporation and administration of Russian Orthodox churches. Id. at 97. The purpose of
the article was to give the churches administrative autonomy from the governing synod in Moscow.
Id. at 98.
53. Id. at 107-08.
54. 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
55. Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960) (per curiam). Kreshik involved
an ejectment action to regain possession of St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York City. Id. at 190-91.
The conflict regarded whether the Archbishop of the North American Archdiocese of the Russian
Orthodox Greek Catholic Church, as appointed by the Patriarch of Moscow, was entitled to the use
and occupancy of St. Nicholas Cathedral. Id. at 190.
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2. The Development of the Doctrine of Neutral Principles of
Law
Sixteen years after Kedroff, the Court decided Presbyterian Church
v. Hull Church.56 The Court's analysis in Hull Church indicated a
significant shift in the Court's analytical framework regarding doctrinal
disputes. 57 Hull Church involved a property dispute resulting from a
split in the Presbyterian Church of the United States over the church's
official position on issues such as ordination of women ministers, the
removal of Bible reading and prayer from public schools and the
Vietnam conflict. 58 Consistent with Watson, the Court recognized that
the resolution of property disputes becomes problematic when the
disputes involve "controversies over church doctrine and practice." 59
However, the Court made a significant departure from Watson and its
progeny by noting that "neutral principles of law" may be applied in
property disputes without impermissibly "establishing" churches. 6 0
Thus, while affirming the rule that civil courts cannot weigh the signifi-
cance and meaning of religious doctrines as a basis for decisions, the
Court in Hull Church supported the permissibility of resolutions based
on neutral principles. 6 1 As a result, church property disputes may be re-
solved based on neutral principles such as the language of deeds, the
terms of local church charters, state statutes governing ownership of
church property, and the constitutional provisions of the church
regarding ownership and control of church property. 62
In a later case, and in spite of the introduction of the "neutral
principles of law" doctrine, the Court appeared to revert to the tradition-
al Watson analysis 63 in resolving a religious dispute over the removal and
suspension of a bishop and the reorganization of a diocese. 64 The Court
56. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
57. See John E. Fennelly, Property Disputes and Religious Schisms: Who is the Church?, 9 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 319, 325-27 (1997) (noting that the Court's historical analysis in Watson and Kedroff
was replaced by "a much more sanitized analysis" in Hull Church, focusing on the property issues that
fronted the essential cause of the controversy (religion)).
58. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 442 n.l (1969).
59. Id. at 445.
60. Id. at 449.
61. Id. Maryland & Virginia Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1969) (per
curiam). This case involved a dispute over ownership and control of church property between the
General Eldership of the Churches of God and two secessionist congregations. Id. at 367.
62. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. at 367.
63. Fennelly, supra note 56, at 328.
64. Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976). See also Fennelly,
supra note 56, at 328 (discussing the Court's doctrinal reversion in Milivojevich). The Mother Church
of the Serbian Orthodox Church suspended and eventually removed Dionisije Milivojevich from his
position as the bishop of the American-Canadian diocese of the church. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at
697-98. The church then reorganized the American-Canadian diocese into three separate dioceses.
[VOL. 75:587
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held that resolution of these issues required a detailed inquiry into
religious doctrine, an inquiry which was constitutionally prohibited.
65
Additionally, the Court emphasized again that civil courts must accept
the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of a church as binding
when dealing with matters of church polity or law. 66 However, the
Court's return to the Watson analysis was brief.67
In 1978, the Court addressed whether civil courts may resolve
church disputes based on neutral principles of law or whether the Watson
approach, deference to the highest tribunal of the church, precludes its
use.68 The Court determined that the neutral principles approach is not
inconsistent with the constitutional principles of Watson and that it has
several advantages as a basis for analysis. 69 First, the neutral principles
approach is wholly secular in operation, yet flexible enough to allow for
all variations of religious organization and polity. 70 Next, it relies
exclusively on objective concepts of trust and property law.71 Finally, it
frees civil courts from entanglement in inquiries involving religious
doctrine, polity, and practice. 72 Thus, states are constitutionally entitled
to adopt the neutral principles of law approach as a means of resolving
church property disputes. 73
B. NORTH DAKOTA CIVIL COURTS GIVE DEFERENCE TO DECISIONS OF
THE CHURCH ON ECCLESIASTICAL ISSUES
The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the propriety of civil
courts deciding doctrinal questions for the first time in Bendewald v.
Ley, 74 a 1917 case. 75 Bendewald involved a property dispute resulting
from a schism in a Lutheran church: One faction of the church had
Id. at 698. Milivojevich brought a civil action against the church, and the Supreme Court'of Illinois
held that the actions of the church were defective under the internal regulations of the church. Id.
65. Id. at 709.
66. Id.
67. Fennelly, supra note 57, at 330.
68. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 597 (1979). The Vineville church was a member church of the
Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS). Id. At a congre-
gational meeting of the Vineville Church, the majority voted to separate from the PCUS. Id. at 598.
The majority notified the PCUS of this decision and then united with another denomination. Id. The
minority began conducting its activities at a separate location. Id. The Augusta-Macon Presbytery
conducted an investigation into the dispute and determined that the minority faction constituted "the
true congregation of Vineville Presbyterian Church." Id. Representatives of the minority faction then
brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive orders establishing their right to exclusive use and
possession of the church property. Id. at 598-99.
69. Id. at 602. The Court, however, recognized the difficulty of the neutral principles approach.
Id. at 604. The Court cautioned that civil courts using the method must be scrupulous in examining
religious documents only in secular terms. Id.
70. Id. at 603.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 604.
74. 168 N.W. 693 (N.D. 1917).
75. Bendewald v. Ley, 168 N.W. 693 (N.D. 1917).
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severed ties with the Missouri Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church
and adopted the doctrines of the Iowa Synod. 76 The plaintiffs, associ-
ating themselves with the Missouri Synod, sought to have the court
restrain the defendants from using church property for the purpose of
teaching the doctrines of the Iowa Synod and asked the court to declare
that the defendants seceded from the church and were no longer
members .77
The court, without citing any federal or North Dakota authority,
determined that civil courts should not assume jurisdiction in cases
involving doctrinal or ecclesiastical questions until such questions are
resolved by the proper authority within the religious organization. 78 The
court recognized that it was being asked to determine the fundamental
orthodox doctrines of the Lutheran Church and to determine whether
the defendants had departed from principles. 79 Making such determina-
tions, the court held, is not within the power of the civil courts. 80 Addi-
tionally, the court identified circumstances under which a civil court
determination may be appropriate due to the absence of doctrinal
questions .81
The court was not confronted with this issue again until 1946.82
When it did fare the issue, it relied heavily on Watson, stating that when
ecclesiastical bodies make decisions and interpret their own laws, civil
courts cannot interfere with church procedures. 83 The North Dakota
Supreme Court did not have occasion to revisit this issue until
Burckhard, more than fifty years later.
76. Id. at 694.
77. Id. at 695.
78. Id. at 698.
79. Id. at 696.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 697 (suggesting that a civil court might be able to resolve a dispute involving a deed
transferring property to a religious organization where a trust describes how the property is to be used
and where there is a diversion of the property to an entirely different use than that expressed in the
trust).
82. Presbytery of Bismarck v. Allen, 22 N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 1946). The First Presbyterian Church
of Leith was organized and enrolled with the Presbytery of Bismarck in 1910. Id. at 627. The
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (PCUS) loaned the
local church money for building costs. Id. The local church conducted all of its affairs in accordance
with the laws of the PCUS until 1936. Id. In 1936, many pastors and members of the PCUS became
dissatisfied with the PCUS, and they organized a new denomination, the First Presbyterian Church of
America, which was later renamed the Orthodox Presbyterian Church. Id. The congregation of the
First Presbyterian Church at Leith adopted a resolution renouncing its association with the PCUS. Id.
The Presbytery of Bismarck sent representatives to Leith to take control of the church, but they were
prevented from doing so by defendant members of the congregation. Id. at 628.
83. Id. at 631.
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C. CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Although the First Amendment protects conduct grounded on
religious belief, such conduct is subject to the police power of the govern-
ment under certain circumstances. 84 For example, First Amendment pro-
tection does not extend to fraudulent activities performed in the name of
religion. 85 Moreover, whether a clergy member's wrongful conduct
violates church policy or canon law does not preclude the conduct from
prosecution under secular criminal law. 86 Not only is criminal prosecu-
tion permissible under some circumstances, but members of the clergy
may also be sued in civil court for the same misconduct that gives rise to
criminal prosecution. 87 While several courts have rejected First Amend-
ment arguments in criminal prosecutions, as discussed below, no court
has dismissed a criminal prosecution specifically against a member of
the clergy on First Amendment excessive entanglement grounds.88
For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Rasheed89 rejected a defendant minister's argument that the First Amend-
ment barred his mail fraud conviction. The minister asserted that the
church program involved was a religious tenet of the church and that the
First Amendment precluded the government from proving its fraudu-
lence.90 However, the court noted that the United States Supreme Court
has held that, even though the validity of religious beliefs cannot be ques-
tioned, the sincerity of a person claiming to hold beliefs may be scruti-
nized. 91 The court's decision therefore pivoted on whether the minister
84. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (providing that states may regulate the conduct
of individuals, even if the conduct is based upon religion, to promote health, safety, or general
welfare).
85. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (providing that states may protect their
citizens from such fraudulent activities and that penal laws are available to punish such conduct).
86. See United States v. Fawbush, 946 F.2d 584, 588 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming pastor's convic-
tion for aggravated sexual abuse); People v. Hodges, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412, 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(convicting a pastor for failure to report suspected incidents of child abuse); McGowan v. State, 402
S.E.2d 328, 331 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming pastor's conviction for child molestation, cruelty to
children, and aggravated assault with attempt to rape).
87. See Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 81-82 (D.R.I. 1997) (denying motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction in an action against a priest for damages caused by sexual assault by
the priest against minors); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1390 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (refusing motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in an action against a priest alleging sexual exploitation in
violation of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of
St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (finding civil action against
church for sexual abuse of child by pastor was not unconstitutional).
88. State v. Burckhard, 1998 N.D. 121, 30, 579 N.W.2d 194, 201 n.2.
89. 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
90. United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157
(1982).
91. Id. (citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965)).
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sincerely believed in the allegedly fraudulent aspects of the program. 92
The court explained that knowingly making false assertions indicates
that the assertions could not have been made pursuant to a sincere
religious belief.93 Therefore, the lower case court found that the First
Amendment did not bar the minister's conviction. 94
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a minister's
First Amendment claim against a conviction for mail fraud and tax
evasion. 95 Among other arguments, the minister contended that charg-
ing him for failing to disclose to the church payments received as a
kickback from the construction of a church building involved imper-
missible governmental involvement in internal church affairs. 96 The
court, however, stated that the First Amendment is a shield intended to
provide religious protection, not a sword to be used against the church.97
The court quickly dismissed the First Amendment argument, stating that
the defendant's First Amendment rights were not involved in the case.98
In a case involving a criminal prosecution for securities fraud and
income tax evasion, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a
defendant pastor's First Amendment challenge. 99 The pastor asserted
that determination of appropriate uses of church money, a central issue
for the charges, required the government to make a determination that
violated the First Amendment.100 The Court found the pastor's First
Amendment challenge without merit, however, because neither the
government's investigation nor the court's adjudication required any
examination of religious law or ecclesiastical decisions.lOl Therefore, al-
though three circuits have heard the argument in recent years, no court
has dismissed a criminal prosecution against a member of the clergy on
First Amendment excessive entanglement grounds, and it is in this con-
text that the North Dakota Supreme Court heard State v. Burckhard.102
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 849.
95. See United States v. Snowden, 770 F.2d 393 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1175 (1985).
96. Id. at 395.
97. Id. at 396.
98. Id. (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), the circuit court stated that "[c]onstitu-
tional rights are not fungible commodities to be bartered among interested bystanders").
99. United States v. Lilly, 37 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1175 (1995).
100. Id. at 1226.
101. Id.




In Burckhard, the North Dakota Supreme Court examined whether
the district court erred in dismissing a criminal complaint against a
Catholic priest for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 10 3 The court
reversed on the grounds that a court's exercise of jurisdiction over
prosecution of theft charges does not require excessive government
entanglement in religious affairs in violation of the state or federal
constitutions.10 4 The court remanded for a trial on the merits.10 5
A. THE MAJORITY FINDS PRIEST NOT ABOVE-OR BEYOND--THE LAW
Writing for the majority, Justice Sandstrom rejected Burckhard's
assertion that the district court constitutionally lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. 106 The majority ultimately concluded that legal authority
requiring civil courts to defer to the rulings of churches on ecclesiastical
matters had no bearing on a case involving criminal proceedings. 0 7
The majority began its analysis by reviewing the major cases in the
development of this area of law. It started by examining Watson, the
seminal case regarding separation of church and state.10 8 The majority
noted that in Watson, the United States Supreme Court admonished
courts to show deference to the decisions of the highest church
authority.i0
9
The majority next discussed the role of Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic
Archbishopl 10 in the evolution of the civil law.II The majority identi-
fied that the United States Supreme Court in Gonzalez reaffirmed the
rule from Watson that civil courts must give deference to the decisions of
the church on ecclesiastical questions.112
Kedroff was the next United States Supreme Court decision the
majority addressed.l1 3 The majority noted that in Kedroff, the United
103. Id. 1 1,579 N.W.2d at 195.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. 24, 579 N.W.2d at 200.
107. Id. However, before making this determination, the majority went through a fairly detailed
analysis of the civil case law. See generally id. IN 13-22, 579 N.W.2d at 197-99. Considering that the
majority decided that the civil authority ultimately had no bearing on a case involving criminal proceed-
ings, it is interesting that the majority opinion borrowed significant amounts of language from the
opinions of the civil cases. Id. See infra notes 119, 123 and accompanying text.
108. Burckhard, 1 13, 579 N.W.2d at 197.
109. Id. (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871)).
110. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
111. Burckhard, 14-15, 579 N.W.2d at 197.
112. Id. 15 (quoting Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929)).
113. Burckhard, 16, 579 N.W.2d at 197.
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States Supreme Court emphasized that the basis for civil court deference
to ecclesiastical decisions of the church is the First Amendment right to
free exercise of religion without state interference."14 As indicated by
the majority, Kedroff thus elevates the Watson rule from its original basis
upon general principles of separation of church and state.' 1 5
Hull Church was the next civil case that the majority examined in
detail.'16 The majority included a lengthy quotation from Hull
Church 117 in which the United States Supreme Court recognized that
there are neutral principles of law which may be applied in property
cases without examining religious doctrine or practice.118
Finally, the court discussed Serbian Eastern Orthodox v. Milivoje-
vichll 9 in detail.120  Again including an extensive quotation from the
United States Supreme Court,121 the majority noted that the decision in
114. Id. (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1952)).
115. Id.
116. Burckhard, 17, 579 N.W.2d at 197-98.
117. Id. The excerpt from Hull Church quoted by the majority in Burckhard was:
[T]he First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in
resolving church property disputes. It is obvious, however, that not every civil court
decision as to property claimed by a religious organization jeopardized values protected
by the First Amendment. Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by
opening their doors to disputes involving church property. And there are neutral prin-
ciples of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without
,establishing' churches to which property is awarded. But First Amendment values are
plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by
civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts under-
take to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards
are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of impli-
cating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. Because of these
hazards, the First Amendment enjoins the employment of organs of government for essen-
tially religious purposes, . . . [Tihe Amendment therefore commands civil courts to de-
cide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious
doctrine ....
Burckhard, 17, 579 N.W.2d at 198 (quoting Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449
(1969)).
118. Id.
119. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
120. Burckhard, 18, 579 N.W.2d at 198.
121. Id. The excerpt from Milivojevich quoted by the majority in Burckhard was as follows:
[W]here resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil
courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that
civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a
church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their
application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them ....
Yet having recognized that the Serbian Orthodox Church is hierarchical and that the
decisions to suspend and defrock respondent Dionisije were made by the religious bodies
in whose sole discretion the authority to make those ecclesiastical decisions was vested,
the Supreme Court of Illinois nevertheless invalidated the decision to defrock Dionisije
on the ground that it was 'arbitrary' because a 'detailed review of the evidence discloses
that the proceedings resulting in Bishop Dionisije's removal and defrockment were not in
accordance with the prescribed procedure of the constitution and the penal code of the
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Serbian recognized that the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate
that civil courts must accept the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical
body within a church as binding, at least when the decisions involve
church doctrine. 122 After this thorough examination of civil cases, the
majority ultimately concluded that the legal authority requiring civil
courts to defer to the rulings of churches on ecclesiastical matters had no
bearing on a case involving criminal proceedings.1
23
Therefore, the majority turned to criminal cases from courts in
other jurisdictions for guidance.124  After close examination of these
decisions, all of which allowed courts to exercise jurisdiction over
prosecutions against members of the clergy, the court concluded that
prosecution against Burckhard would not require excessive entanglement
in matters of the Catholic church's doctrine.125 Specifically, the court
found that prosecuting Burckhard for allegedly using church money for
personal expenditures does not require the court to interpret
ecclesiastical doctrine, policy, or laws.126
The majority began this analysis of criminal cases from other juris-
dictions by examining United States v. Rasheed.127 Rasheed involved
the prosecution and conviction of a minister for fraudulently conducting
a donation program. 128 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
Serbian Orthodox Church.' ... Not only was this 'detailed review' impermissible under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but in reaching this conclusion, the court evaluated
conflicting testimony concerning internal church procedures and rejected the interpreta-
tions of relevant procedural provisions by the Mother Church's highest tribunals ... In
short, under the guise of 'minimal' review under the umbrella of 'arbitrariness,' the
Illinois Supreme Court has unconstitutionally undertaken the resolution of quintessentially
religious controversies whose resolution the First Amendment commits exclusively to the
highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church ....
Burckhard, 18, 579 N.W.2d at 198-99 (quoting Serbian Eastern Orthodox v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 717-18 (1976)).
122. Id.
123. Id. 24, 579 N.W.2d at 200. Before reaching this conclusion, however, the majority also
recognized that the North Dakota Supreme Court has also held that civil courts must give deference to
church decisions on ecclesiastical issues in resolving property disputes. See id. 1 20, 579 N.W.2d at
199 (quoting Presbytery of Bismarck v. Allen, 22 N.W.2d 625, 631 (N.D. 1946) and citing Bendewald
v. Ley, 168 N.W. 693, 697 (N.D. 1917)). The majority also briefly discussed other appellate court
decisions in civil cases involving impermissible entanglement in ecclesiastical issues. See id. TI 21-22
(citing Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, 991 F.2d 468. 471 (8th Cir. 1993), which involved the allegation
of a minister that the church violated its own bylaws by taking the minister's name off of a list of
ministers eligible for employment); McDonnell v. Episcopal Diocese of Ga., 381 S.E.2d 126, 127
(Ga.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989), which involved a minister's allegation of breach of contract
by the Diocese for terminating his employment); and Basich v. Board of Pensions, 540 N.W.2d 82, 86
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 55 (1996), which involved a breach of contract and
fiduciary duty claim for investments made by a church on behalf of the congregation.
124. Burckhard, 26, 579 N.w.2d at 200.
125. Id.
126. Id. 131,579 N.W.2d at 201.
127. Id. 1 27, 579 N.W.2d at 200 (citing United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982)).
128. Id.
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minister's First Amendment argument, concluding that First Amendment
protection does not extend to fraudulent activity. 129
Next, the majority examined a case in which a minister was convict-
ed for mail fraud and tax evasion after being paid kickbacks for a
church construction project.130 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the minister's First Amendment argument by determining that
the prosecution would not involve an impermissible risk of entangling
the government in religious doctrine or policy.131
Finally, the majority examined a case involving the prosecution of a
pastor for securities fraud and income tax evasion. 132 Once again, a First
Amendment challenge to conviction was rejected, this time by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.133
Having considered cases involving criminal prosecutions of mem-
bers of the clergy from other jurisdictions, the majority was persuaded
that prosecution of Burckhard did not require the court to interpret or
review ecclesiastical doctrine or policy.134 The State bore the burden of
producing evidence of Burckhard's authority and of his conduct outside
of that authority, and the question of whether Burckhard made unautho-
rized expenditures of church money was for a factfinder to determine. 135
Additionally, Justice Sandstrom's majority opinion rejected Burck-
hard's contention that dismissal was justified because he had "legal"
authority over the money he spent. 136 The majority stated that the issue
of Burckhard's authority is a question of fact. 137 As such, the issue is
not appropriate for resolution by dismissal, but rather is a question for a
trial on the merits.138
129. Id. (citing Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 847).
130. Id. 1 28, 579 N.W.2d at 200 (citing United States v. Snowden, 770 F.2d 393 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1011 (1985)).
131. Id.
132. Id. 29, 579 N.W.2d at 200-01 (citing United States v. Lilly, 37 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1175 (1985)).
133. Id.
134. Id. 131,579 N.W.2d at 201.
135. Id.
136. Id. I 33, 35, 579 N.W.2d at 202.
137. Id. 136.
138. Id., 579 N.W.2d at 202-03.
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B. DISSENT FINDS DETERMINATION OF AUTHORITY WOULD REQUIRE
IMPERMISSIBLE GOVERNMENTAL ENTANGLEMENT IN RELIGIOUS
AFFAIRS
Justice Meschke, in an opinion' 39 joined by Justice Maring,
140
dissented, stating that this case could not proceed on remand to deter-
mine the scope of Burckhard's authority without an examination and
interpretation of church laws and policies. 141 Justice Meschke stated that
the majority failed to consider adequately a letter from the Bishop of the
Diocese of Fargo explaining the scope of authority of parish priests.142
This letter, in Justice Meschke's view, expressly established that the
church had the right to adjudicate and enforce its own ecclesiastical
laws. 143
Although agreeing with the majority that courts may exercise juris-
diction over criminal prosecutions involving clergy, Justice Meschke dis-
tinguished the alleged crime in this case, theft of church property, from
other crimes in which prosecution is not prohibited.144 Moreover, Justice
Meschke stated that embezzlement from a church is necessarily a proper-
ty dispute and that the accused official's authority is determined by the
internal policies of the church.145 Justice Meschke therefore urged that
prosecution is only permissible when it involves violations of neutral
legal standards which do not rely upon the internal authority of the
prosecuted church official.146 Furthermore, Justice Meschke insisted that
139. Id. 1 43, 579 N.W.2d at 203.
140. Id. 1 59, 579 N.w.2d at 207.
141. Id. 144, 579 N.W.2d at 203-04. Justice Meschke believed that evidence of Burckhard's
authority, shown through testimony of church officials, by its nature involved examination of religious
policies. Id.
142. Id. 45, 579 N.W.2d at 204. Justice Meschke quoted Bishop Sullivan's letter, which stated:
In juridical matters, the pastor acts in the name of the parish. The pastor has responsibili-
ty for the administration of all parish property. If he is negligent in his duties, however, it
is the right of the Bishop to intervene... recourse could be either through ecclesiastical
courts or through the Bishop.
Id.
143. Id. 47, 579 N.W.2d at 204-05.
144. Id. 51, 579 N.W.2d at 205. Examples of such crimes are mail fraud, tax evasion, child
molestation, and sexual abuse. Id.
145. Id. 46, 579 N.w.2d at 204.
146. Id. 51, 579 N.W.2d at 205.
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dismissal by the district court was appropriate because of the important
constitutional elements of the case. 147
C. THE DETERMINATIVE CONCURRING OPINION
Chief Justice VandeWalle, concurring specially, agreed with the re-
mand ordered in Justice Sandstrom's opinion, but only to a limited
extent. 148 The Chief Justice urged the trial court on remand to seek
clarification of Burckhard's authority to spend church funds.149 More-
over, Chief Justice VandeWalle indicated that if Justice Meschke correct-
ly construed Burckhard's authority over the church funds, as indicated
by the Bishop's letter, he would concur in Justice Meschke's opinion. 150
Thus, upon clarification of the Bishop that Burckhard had authority over
the church funds, Justice Meschke's position would be the majority view
of the court. 151 Without it, however, Chief Justice VandeWalle's vote
made Justice Sandstrom's the majority opinion.152
IV. IMPACT
The North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Burckhard is monu-
mental in several respects. First, for the first time, not only in North
Dakota, but in the nation the court addressed and rejected a First Amend-
ment excessive governmental entanglement argument in a case involving
the prosecution of a member of the clergy. 153 This decision thus has the
potential to serve as persuasive authority for courts nationwide. In the
future, cases involving the prosecution for any number of crimes which
arguably involve the policies of a church may turn to Burckhard for
guidance and authority.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the decision, however, is the
course that the case has subsequently taken. After the decision in Burck-
hard, Bishop Sullivan of the Fargo Diocese of the Catholic Church wrote
a letter to Burckhard's attorney clarifying the scope of Burckhard's
147. Id. 1 54, 579 N.W.2d at 206 (stating that "[t]he question of jurisdiction of secular courts over
church funds and canon law are [sic] too important to be deferred until the entire case has been adjudi-
cated"). However, Justice Meschke noted that he would modify the dismissal. Id. 56. While the
dismissal from the trial court was made with prejudice, Justice Meschke would dismiss without preju-
dice so that renewal of the prosecution would be possible if the Bishop or a higher church official
chose to participate in the prosecution of criminal charges against Burckhard. Id.
148. Id. 41, 579 N.W.2d at 203 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring specially). See infra note 163
and accompanying text.




153. Burckhard, 30, 579 N.W.2d at 201 n.2.
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authority to spend church money. 154 In his brief letter, Bishop Sullivan
stated that Justice Meschke's dissenting opinion in Burckhard155 correct-
ly interpreted Burckhard's authority.156 Chief Justice VandeWalle, con-
curring specially in Burckhard, had indicated that he would join the
opinion of the two dissenting justices if Justice Meschke had correctly
interpreted the scope of Burckhard's authority over the money, as the
letter indicated he had. 157 Burckhard therefore submitted the letter to
the district court with the renewed motion for dismissal.158 The district
court then found that the Bishop's clarification required dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the dissenting and concurring opinions
of the court in Burckhard.
159
The State appealed this decision to the North Dakota Supreme
Court.160 Oral arguments before the court were heard on January 13,
1998.161 In Burckhard II,162 the court addressed whether the district
court's decision to dismiss without prejudice was consistent with the
mandate of Burckhard.163
154. Although this letter of clarification was sent to Burckhard's attorney, both the State and
Burckhard requested the clarification. Brief for Appellee at 5, State v. Burckhard (Burckhard I1),
1999 N.D. 64, 592 N.W.2d 523 (No. 980322). However, the request from the State dated March 5,
1998 tersely asked two questions: 1) "Does Bishop Sullivan support my decision to prosecute the case
against Fr. Leonard Burckhard in State court[,]" and 2) "Does Bishop Sullivan, looking at the items
that Scott H. knows Father Burckhard spent the approximate $189,000 on during his tenure at St.
Catherine's, approve the spending that he did[.]" Appendix to Brief for Appellant at app. 56, State v.
Burckhard (Burckhard 1I), 1999 N.D. 64, 592 N.W.2d (No. 980322). This letter, written by State's
Attorney Robin Huseby to Nicholas Spaeth, the Diocesan attorney, also stated that the formal request
could also be declined. Id. In response to this request, Mr. Spaeth indicated that Bishop Sullivan did
not wish to comment on the matter. Id. at app. 57. On the other hand, Burckhard sent Bishop Sullivan
a copy of the decision in Burckhard and requested the clarification sought by Chief Justice
VandeWalle in the concurring opinion. Brief for Appellee at 6, Burckhard II (No. 980322).
155. Burckhard, 1 45, 579 N.W.2d at 204 (Meschke, J., dissenting).
156. Bishop Sullivan's September 15, 1998 letter to Burckhard's attorney, Robert Hoy, consisted
of two paragraphs:
Thank you for providing me a copy of the recent decision of the North Dakota
Supreme Court in the case entitled "State of North Dakota v. Leonard Wayne Burck-
hard," Criminal No. 970275. 1 have now had the opportunity to read thoroughly each of
the three opinions issued by the justices in reaching their decision.
In an effort to clarify my position as to the authority of Father Burckhard to spend the
money in question, I write to indicate the opinion of Justice Meschke, joined by Justice
Maring, correctly interprets my previous letter of July 21, 1997, on that issue. I hope this
will be helpful to all concerned.
Appendix to Brief for Appellant at app. 101, Burckhard 1I (No. 980322).
157. Burckhard, 41, 579 N.W.2d at 203 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring specially).
158. Burckhard I1, 2, 592 N.W.2d at 524.
159. Id.
160. Supplemental Appendix to Brief for Appellee at app. 110, State v. Burckhard (Burckhard
!I), 1999 N.D. 64, 592 N.W.2d (No. 980322).
161. North Dakota Supreme Court (visited July 28, 1999) <http://www.court.state.nd.us/Court/
Calendar/19980322.htm>.
162. 1999 ND 64, 592 N.W.2d 523.
163. Burckhard II, 7, 592 N.W.2d at 525.
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Chief Justice VandeWalle's concurrence in Burckhard, consisting of
just three sentences, 164 played an important role in Burckhard H. The
concurrence is artful. Simple on its face, it seems to stand for two clear
propositions: First, remand was appropriate to clarify Bishop Sullivan's
position as to Burckhard's authority, and second, if the Bishop said
Burckhard had authority over the funds, the Chief Justice would join
Justice Meschke's opinion to affirm the dismissal. 165 Upon closer exami-
nation, however, it becomes evident that Chief Justice VandeWalle's
opinion is not as clear as it might appear.166
The first major ambiguity in the concurring opinion is what would
be sufficient to "clarify" the Bishop's position.167 This statement that
"th[e] matter should be remanded to clarify the Bishop's position"
suggests that the Chief Justice thought the issue should be resolved at
trial.168 However, Chief Justice VandeWalle essentially provided in his
opinion that a letter from Bishop Sullivan would resolve the issue: "If
the Bishop's response is as Justice Meschke construes the current re-
sponse .... "169 By referring to both Bishop Sullivan's first letter and
the then-unwritten second letter as "response[s]," the Chief Justice
intimated that a follow-up letter from Bishop Sullivan endorsing Justice
Meschke's interpretation of his first letter would be sufficient to satisfy
the contingency required for Chief Justice VandeWalle to join the
dissent.170 Unsurprisingly, such an endorsement of Justice Meschke's
interpretation of the first letter is precisely what Bishop Sullivan's
subsequent letter provided.171
An additional consideration with regard to the standard necessary to
meet the condition in Chief Justice VandeWalle's concurring opinion is
that the second letter written by Bishop Sullivan was not in affidavit
form.172 The State stipulated that the Bishop's first letter was in affidavit
164. Burckhard, 41, 579 N.W.2d at 203 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring specially). The concur-
ring opinion, in its entirety, states:
Insofar as the opinion written by Justice Sandstrom and the opinion written by Justice
Meschke view Bishop Sullivan's letter differently, I believe this matter should be re-
manded to clarify the Bishop's position as to the question of the authority of Father Burck-
hard to spend the money. To this limited extent, I agree with the remand ordered in
Justice Sandstrom's opinion. If the Bishop's response is as Justice Meschke construes the








171. See supra note 154.
172. Supplemental Appendix to Brief for Appellee at app. 113, State v. Burckhard (Burckhard
I), 1999 N.D. 64, 592 N.W.2d 523 (No. 980322). This document is a memorandum written by District
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form.173 With regard to the second letter, the district judge, probably
recognizing the import of the second letter, notified the attorneys for
both sides of the fact that the letter was not in affidavit form and provid-
ed the opportunity for the State to raise it as an issue. 174 The State
responded by affirmatively stating that the form of the letter was not an
issue. 175 The State probably erred in not objecting to the admission of
the letter, and it should have realized this error upon notification by the
district judge.176
In the appeal of Burckhard IH to the supreme court, the State raised
several questions with regard to the posture and intent of Bishop
Sullivan.177 Unfortunately for the prosecution, the resolution of such
questions would require an inquiry into church affairs which would
constitute excessive government entanglement, as prohibited by both the
state and federal constitutions, 178 which the supreme court recognized. 179
The majority opinion of Justice Sandstrom in Burckhard recognized that
"[t]he Establishment Clause forbids courts from second-guessing the
church's ruling on internal matters of policy and doctrine, because the
process of second-guessing would require excessive government
entanglement in church affairs."180 Citing this paragraph of Justice
Sandstrom's opinion in Burckhard, Justice Maring's majority opinion in
Burckhard H stated that "[t]he State's wish to second-guess the Bishop's
position is precisely the type of governmental foray into internal church
affairs that would violate the basic principles of separation of church and
Judge Everett Nels Olson to the attorneys for both sides of the dispute, dated September 23, 1998. See
id. Judge Olson was the trial judge presiding over the proceedings on remand. See id.
173. Id. at app. 104. This document is the Stipulation for Clarification of Record, dated August
28, 1997, and signed by the attorneys representing both sides of the dispute. See id.
174. Id. at app. 113.
175. Id. at app. 114. This document is a memorandum written by State's Attorney Robin Huseby
to Judge Everett Nels Olson in reply to his September 23, 1998 memorandum. See id.
176. Id. at app. 113-14.
177. See Brief for Appellant at 5-7, State v. Burckhard (Burckhard 11), 1999 N.D. 64, 592
N.W.2d 523 (No. 980322). An example of the questions raised by the State involves the possibility
that Bishop Sullivan's position as to the authority of Burckhard has changed over time. Id. at 5.
Another example of the questions raised by the prosecution is that the Bishop had a bias and a vested
interest in having the case dismissed, in that the Diocese would not then bear any responsibility for the
theft by an employee, Burckhard. Appendix to Brief for Appellant at app. 50, State v. Burckhard
(Burckhard 1), 1999 N.D. 64, 592 N.W.2d 523 (No. 980322). The State raised this question in its the
Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, dated Sept. 17, 1998. See id. at app. 51.
178. See supra notes 31, 33 and accompanying text.
179. Burckhard Il, 9a 10, 16, 592 N.W.2d at 526.
180. Burckhard, 25, 579 N.W.2d at 200, cited in Defendant's Reply Brief on Renewed Motion
to Dismiss (Jurisdiction), Appendix to Brief for Appellant at app. 45, Burckhard 1I (No. 980322).
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state."181 The decision in Burckhard II therefore affirmed the district
court's order dismissing the charges against Burckhard.182
However, the importance and novelty of Burckhard remain, and it
still may be persuasive authority for courts nationwide. Essentially,
Burckhard stands for the proposition that in a case involving questions as
to the authority of a priest to spend church money, the State may
constitutionally proceed with prosecution. 8 3
MaryBeth Hegstad
181. Burckhard 11, 1 9, 592 N.W.2d at 525. Justice Neumann's concurring opinion also
referenced Justice Sandstrom's warning in Burckhard and chastised the State:
I thought Justice Sandstrom's opinion in Burckhard 1, the opinion in which I concurred,
made it quite clear that any attempt to reach beyond the question of Father Burckhard's
authority, any attempt to probe the validity, veracity, or accuracy of the Bishop's
pronouncement regarding that authority, would be strictly forbidden by the First
Amendment. Apparently, the opinion was not clear enough to deter the State from
venturing into such forbidden territory.
Burckhard I. 16, 592 N.W.2d at 526 (Neumann, J., concurring).
182. Burckhard I1, 11, 592 N.W.2d at 526.
183. Burckhard, 39, 579 N.W.2d at 203.
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